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Abstract 
We propose an internally consistent and comprehensive statistical model for 
analyzing multiparty, district-level aggregate election data. This model can be 
used to explain or predict how the geographic distribution of electoral results 
depends upon economic conditions, neighborhood ethnic compositions, cam­
paign spending, and other features of the election campaign or characteristics 
of the aggregate areas. We also provide several new graphical representations 
for help in data exploration, model evaluation, and substantive interpretation. 
Although the model applies more generally, we use it to help resolve an 
important controversy over the size of and trend in the electoral advantage 
of incumbency in Great Britain. Contrary to previous analyses, which are 
all based on measures now known to be biased, we demonstrate that the in­
cumbency advantage is small but politically meaningful. We also find that it 
differs substantially across the parties, about half a percent for the Conserva­
tives, 1 % for the Labor Party, and 3% for the Liberal party and its successors. 
Also contrary to previous research, we show that these effects have not grown 
in recent years. Finally, we are able to estimate from which party each party's 
incumbency advantage is predominantly drawn. 
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1 Introduction 
We propose the first internally consistent and comprehensive statistical model for analyz­
ing multiparty, district-level aggregate election data. Our model can be applied directly 
to explain or predict how the geographic distribution of electoral results depends upon 
economic conditions, neighborhood ethnic compositions, campaign spending, or other 
features of the election campaign or characteristics of the aggregate areas. We also pro­
vide several new graphical representations for help in data exploration, model evaluation, 
and substantive interpretation.1 
Our general model is intended to address three serious lacunae in the study of compar­
ative politics. First, most literatures focusing on non-American elections are dominated 
by survey data alone rather than also including studies of real election results. 2 Survey re­
search has enormous advantages for studying individual-level preferences but , as analyses 
of random selections of isolated individuals from unknown geographical locations, they 
necessarily miss much of electoral politics. As such, they are often best complemented 
with studies of aggregate electoral returns. 
Second, with surprisingly few exceptions (e.g. , Bellucci ,  1984, 1991; Rattinger, 1991; 
Slider, 1994; and Conford et al. , 1995) , electoral analyses in comparative politics based on 
real election returns use national rather than regional , district, or precinct-level electoral 
data. 3 This approach has the advantage of allowing more countries to be included in 
the analysis without much data collection effort, but it also has serious disadvantages. 
National-level studies prevent researchers from learning where votes come from and why, 
and they generally result in studies based on small numbers of observations and little 
variation on many relevant dimensions. Studies of post-war OECD countries usually 
contain only about a dozen observations (see Paldam, 1991:  18 , Table 1), and analyses 
of former communist countries could include only three or four elections. This is often 
insufficient information with which to parse out many of the interesting effects, and it 
ignores the substantial information content in the often vast differences across different 
regions of a country. 
Finally, the vast majority of electoral studies in multiparty democracies artificially 
dichotomize the electoral system into a pseudo-two party contest. Researchers analyze the 
1 Our model can also be used to evaluate features of electoral systems, such as whether the districting 
system is fair to all the political parties and electorally responsive, although we leave details of this task 
to a future paper. 
2 A few examples of the good survey analyses conducted in multiparty democracies include tho.se in 
England (e.g., Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970), Mexico (Dominguez and McCann, 1996), Poland (Prze­
worski, 1996), Peru (Stokes, 1996), Russia (White et al., 1997), Denmark (Miller and Listhaug, 1985), 
Italy (Bellucci, 1985), West Germany (Frey and Schneider, 1980), multi-country studies (Lewis-Beck, 
1988), among many others. 
3 Such national-level studies have used data from France (Rosa and Amson, 1976), Japan (Inoguchi, 
1980), England (Whiteley, 1980), Italy (Bellucci, 1984), time series of cross-sectional data from multiple 
countries (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Paldam, 1986; Host and Paldam, 1990; Lewis-Beck and Mitchell, 
1990; Paldam, 1991), single cross-sections of multiple co�ntries (Lewis-Beck and Bellucci, 1982), among 
many others. 
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vote for the incumbent party vs. all others grouped together, or the vote for a particular 
group, such as left-wing parties, vs. the combination of all the others. This procedure has 
the advantage of enabling the use of standard statistical methods, but since these methods 
were designed for the study of two-party systems (largely in U.S. data) , two serious 
problems result: bias and information loss. The procedure is biased whenever all parties 
do not run candidates in all election districts. For example, even when the governing 
party contests every election, different numbers of parties composing the "other" category 
will generally have large effects on a variable like the "percent of the vote for the governing 
party." Since the vote·a.party expects to receive will normally be related to whether they 
run a candidate, the observed variable will systematically overstate the true underlying 
support for the governing party when this support is highest. This, and other similar 
problems, can combine to severely bias inferences based on such data. 
Moreover, even if partially contested elections happen to cause no bias in a particu­
lar case, important information, critical to comparative politics, is always lost by these 
methods. For example, when the economic pain caused by pro-market reforms in post­
communist countries causes the reformers to be thrown out of office (Przeworski, 199 1; 
Haggard and Webb, 1994; Haggard and Kaufmann, 1995 ), or when the increasing salience 
of ethnic divisions upsets the political order (Offe, 1992 ;  Horowitz, 1985, 1993 ; Tucker, 
1996 ), which parties benefit? How do the electoral fortunes of each of the parties de­
pend on the degree of economic hardship or ethnic divisions? Answering these questions 
about multiparty systems require statistical models that permit multiparty outcomes. 
Shoehorning a complex multiparty democracy into a fake "two-party" system in order to 
perform an analysis that looks like those conducted in American politics takes the wrong 
lessons from that subfield. Making methodological decisions merely to accommodate the 
requirements of familiar statistical methods risks missing the most distinctive and inter­
esting aspects of the electoral system under analysis. The bottom line is that multiparty 
systems require the development of multiparty statistical models. It would appear that 
much substantive knowledge can be gained, and bias reduced, by designing models of 
electoral systems with the special features of these systems in mind. 
Although we intend our model to be applicable to a wide variety of multiparty elec­
toral data, we apply it here to resolve one important scholarly controversy: the size of and 
trend in the electoral advantage of incumbency in the United Kingdom. For decades, the 
conventional wisdom has been that U.K. incumbency advantage is small to nonexistent 
and not increasing. However, this conclusion has come under strong attack recently by 
researchers whose results seem to show that incumbency advantage is moderate to large, 
and growing fast. Unfortunately, it turns out that all estimates given in the literature are 
based on measures now known to be biased. In partial agreement and disagreement with 
the substantive results from both sides, we demonstrate that the incumbency advantage 
is small but markedly different for each of Britain's three major parties. Our methods 
also provide information that others have not attempted to estimate, such as from pre­
cisely which party each incumbent's advantage comes at the expense of. In part because 
the study of incumbency advantage in the United States was so greatly enhanced by a 
quarter century of scholarly work increasing the precision and accuracy of estimates in 
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this two-party system, we hope a similar gain will result in electoral studies of multiparty 
democracies, such as the United Kingdom. 
From a methodological perspective, analyses of aggregate electoral data fall into two 
fundamental categories that should be carefully distinguished - contextual effects and 
ecological inferences. Research questions about the relationships among aggregate vari­
ables require a model of contextual effects, such as that offered here. In contrast, research 
questions about the characteristics of the individuals who make up aggregate electoral 
data require ecological inferences and the special models designed for this purpose (see 
King, 1997) . For example, a study of the effect of having a college in town on the vote 
for more liberal parties is a contextual effect, for which th� model we propose is directly 
useful . In contrast, the question of whether individual college students vote for more 
liberal pol itical parties is an ecological inference. Our statistical model applies to ques­
tions at the district level, such as incumbency advantage estimates or predicting which 
candidate will win. Formal models of individual behavior might be of interest for some 
purposes, but they are not always necessary in cases like these. For much of our discus­
sion, we make the common assumption that candidates are strategic and well informed. 
Our working (testable) assumption about voters is that, conditional on the candidates, 
their voting behavior follows regular patterns of some sort. 
In what follows, we briefly describe the substantive problem (Section 2) , discuss the 
characteristics of multiparty electoral data (Section 3 ), summarize the problems that need 
to be fixed in order to develop a general statistical model (Section 4 ) ,  introduce a simple 
version of the model for cases when all parties contest (Section 5 ), discuss assumptions 
to deal with partially contested elections (Section 6 ) , and show how to estim:ate  (Section 
7) the model and compute quantities of interest (Section 8 ) from these esti.?iates. We 
"'' 
present substantive results as the model is developed. , 
2 . Incumbency Advantage in Great Britain.� : 
.-,.._ 
Until the 1980s, scholars generally agreed that British elections were decided  by national 
and not local forces . The electoral advantage of incumbency - what 1s known in the 
U .S .  and the methodology literature as "incumbency advantage" and in tNe tJ .K. as "the 
personal vote" - was thought to be essentially nonexistent in BritaiJ:i_:� For example, 
Butler and Stokes (1969: 6 ) repeatedly emphasize "the importance of ��tional political 
issues and events as opposed to more local influences on the choice of the individual 
elector ."  They even went so far as to conclude (p .  8 ) that "So important are the [national] 
parties in giving meaning to contests in the individual parliamentary c.o'nBtituencies in 
Britain that for many voters candidates have no identity other then their partisan one" 
(see also Butler and Kavanagh, 1980: 292) . 
4The concept of "the personal vote" in Britain includes any local, candidate-speCific effect, but for 
empirical analyses, it is treated synonymously with incumbency advantage. In the U.S. "the personal 
vote" is often considered to be the fraction of the incumbent's advantage attributable to the person 
rather than the party. 
-
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The few numerical estimates of incumbency advantage in Britain come from a newer 
literature that contradicts this conventional wisdom. For example, Curtice and Steed 
( 1980, 1983) find the "sophomore surge" for  Labour - the average difference in the 
vote for Labour in open seats it wins and the vote in the subsequent election for the 
now-incumbent Labour party candidate - is about 1500 votes (about 3 .8%) in the 1979 
and 1983 elections .  Norton and Wood ( 1990) modify sophomore surge by correcting for 
regional swings and find a surge of 1 .6% for the Conservatives and a remarkable 7.8% 
for Labour. Finally, Wood and Norton (1992) ,  along with the prominent survey-based 
analyses of Cain ,  Ferejohn ,  and Fiorina (1987) , also strongly argue for· the proposition 
that the personal vote is increasing. 
Although the idea of sophomore surge, on which most measures are based, is very 
intuitive, Gelman and King (1990) proved that it gives biased estimates of the causal 
effect of inc umbency. In fact ,  in the U .K. ,  the problem may actually be worse than in 
two-party systems: since most British elections have very few sophomores (usually only 
about two dozen ) , the measure discards more than 95% of the district  observations and 
is therefore exceptionally inefficient. Moreover, the measure is usually applied without 
controls and without any feature of the statistical model th�t recognizes that the system 
being analyzed has more than two parties. 
Thus, we have on one side the conventional wisdom, based on many years of traditional 
analyses, that incumbents have no electoral advantage. On the other side, we have a 
growing systematic quantitative literature which argues that the incumbency advantage 
is moderate to large and steadily growing. We hope  to resolve this scholarly dispute. 
Our data for this paper includes constituency-level election results fro� England 
for 1959 to 1992. We also have more limited data from the 1955 electiol\s, which we 
' ·  
use whenever possible. Geographic districts in England are called "constitliencies ," but 
we use the two words interchangeably because our model applies more ienerally. For 
convenience, we usually refer to the Liberal Party and the Liberal Party 'alliance with 
the Social Democratic Party more simply as the Alliance. 5 
-
3 Characteristics of Multiparty Data 
Let Vii den ote the proportion of the yote (the underline denotes our IT1'rremonic labeling 
convention ) in district i ( i = 1 ,  ... , n) , for party j (j = 1 ,  . . .  , J) . Ywo · fundamental 
features of multiparty voting data are that each proportion falls withiii the unit interval 
Vii E [O , 1] for all i and j ( 1 )  
-
5We began with the dataset "British General Elections, 1955-1992 (version 8 -August 1993) , con-
structed by D.F.L. Darling of University of Newcastle, extracted data from England, updated it, and 
added information on incumbency status. The number of observations in our data for each election year 
is 1955: 460, 1959: 460, 1964: 455, 1966: 488, 1970: 471, 1974(Feb) : 463, 1974(0ct) : 491, 1979: 467, 
1983: 491, 1987: 522, and 1992: 521. 
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Figure 1 :  The Simplex for Two Parties: This figure explains graphically how to reduce 
two vote variables to one dimension. Graph (A) portrays the familiar relationship between 
the vote for the Republicans (ViR) and Democrats (Vin) in the U.S. two-party system; 
because of the constraints of Equations 1 and 2, all points fall on a line segment .and can 
be portrayed more simply as Graph (B). 
and the set of vote proportions for all the parties in a district sum to one: 
for all i (2) 
Thus, an important criterion of a good (and logically possible) statistical model of mul­
tiparty voting data is that it satisfy the constraints in Equations 1 and 2. Variables that 
meet these constraints fall in a region generally referred to as the simplex. 
We now illustrate this simplex sample space graphically for the two and then the 
three party case. For each case, we apply a simple trick to reduce the number of di­
mensions required, making the graphical presentation more manageable, and ultimately 
informative, without losing information. The graphic version of these relationships will 
also be useful for exploring the data, and understanding the model fit . 
For the two party example, we use Yin for the Democratic , and YiR for the Republican, 
shares of the vote in district i for candidates for the U .S .  House of Representatives. 
Obviously, we can easily represent both variables by just one, say Yin, since the other 
is merely YiR = 1 - \tin. Graph (A) in Figure 1 plots Yin by YiR· Because of the 
constraint in Equation 2 ,  all district vote fractions fall on a single line segment and, due 
to the constraint in Equation 1 ,  the line ends at the axes. Thus, all the points in the 
two-dimensional plane in Graph (A) of Figure 1 fall on a simpler one-dimensional line 
segment. Presenting this line segment in Graph (B) reduces the problem from two to 
one dimension without losing any information. 
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Figure 2: The Simplex For Three Parties: In a manner analogous to Figure 1, this figure 
reduces three vote variables to two dimensions. Graph (A) portrays the relationship among 
the votes for the Conservative (Vic), .Labour (ViL), and A lliance (ViA) parties; because 
of the constraints of Equations 1 and 2, all points fall on an equilateral triangle that is 
the intersection of a plane with the three dimensional figure. Graph (B} portrays this 
more simply in two dimensions in a version of what is known as a "ternary diagram." 
Values of the three variables can be read off by where the dots fall perpendicular to the 
three numbered axes. The little square point (with dotted lines referencing the axes} is 
the example discussed in the text. 
Figure 2 provides analogous information for three parties as Figure 1 did for two. 
Graph (A) in Figure 2 plots in three dimensions the three variables from the British 
electoral s·ystem, 1/ic, ViL, and ViA, for the Conservative, 1.abour, and Alliance vote 
proportions, respectively. The constraints in Equation 2 imply that valid points must fall 
on the plane cutting through the three-dimensional space .  The constraints in Equation 
1 require this plane to end at each of the three axes. The resulting area that satisfies 
both constraints is the equilateral triangle we have shaded in Graph (A) . 
Because all the points in three dimensions fall in a two-dimensional area, we can 
save space by presenting the triangle alone in two dimensions, which we do in Figure 2 ,  
Graph (B) . This graph is a version of  what is  known in the literature as a ternary diagram, 
although we have added several new features. In this triangle, each dot fully characterizes 
a single constituency result from the 1979 British election. Roughly speaking, the closer 
a dot is to a vertex (with a party's label, C, L, or A) , the higher the vote total for that 
party; more precisely, a vote total for a party equals the perpendicular distance from the 
side of the triangle opposite to the labeled vertex, as calibrated on the scales we have 
added. That is, the vertical position of the dots in the figure indicate the value of Vic, as 
indicated on the scale on the left . As a dot falls farther from the side opposite the "L" 
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vertex, the larger the ViL variable (as can be seen by comparing the point to the scale at 
the top ) . 
For example, in addition to the real data, we have added one (hypothetical ) election 
result as a small box in the bottom left of the graph. In order to clarify how to read 
the voting results in this district, we added dashed lines connecting this point to the 
three axes. In this district, the Conservatives received 25% of the vote, as can be seen by 
following the dashed line from the box to the left axis that calibrates "\lie. The dashed 
line traces the shortest distance from the axis to the point, or in other words a l ine that 
is perpendicular to the axis. The same district  also gave 25% of its vote to the Labour 
pq,rty (see the.dashed line that heads'northward -to the ViL axis) and half of its votes to 
the Alliance (as can be determined from the dashed line that heads down to the right to 
meet the ViA axis) . The electoral results for all the real districts, represented by dots, 
can also be read by tracing out perpendicular lines to each axis . With all this precision 
available when needed, it is still worth remembering the easier rough way to interpret 
these ternary diagrams: the c loser a point is to a vertex of the triangle, the more votes 
that district gave to the party whose label appears there. 
We have removed most of the sides of the triangle in order to make visible districts 
with zero votes for one of the parties. For example, districts uncontested by the Al­
liance fall on the right side of the triangle, where the bottom axis reveals that ViA = 0 .  
Substantively, these partially contested districts appear to be generated by a different 
process than the mass of (fully contested) districts that fall inside the triangle. This can 
be seen since the distribution of points does not gradually get smaller (or larger) as it 
approaches the side of the triangle; instead, there appears to be an area without dots, 
indicating every party that merely appears on the ballot receives at least 15-20% of the 
vote. 
We have also added lines that divide the triangle into thirds. We call these win lines, 
since they indicate which party wins, depending on which region a point falls in. For 
example, if a point falls in the region at the top of-the graph, the Conservatives win a 
plural ity of the votes and (by the electoral rules) the seat for that constituency. Points 
that fall within the left region are wins for the Alliance, and the right go to the Labour 
Party. The same logic applies to multiparty elections with J > 3 parties, even though 
graphical displays become more unwieldy. 
4 Problems to Fix 
Standard regression-type models applied to multiparty electoral data usually generate 
nonsensical results .  For example, one common approach is to use the vote for each party 
as a dependent variable (fraction for the Conservatives, fraction for the Labour party, 
etc . ), and to regress each on a set of explanatory variables. These J regressions are run 
separately, or via a "seemingly unrelated" system of equations. Since neither constraint 
from Equations 1 and 2 is satisfied, this approach generally fails to give results that 
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are sensible. That is, the model often implies that some parties will get fewer than zero 
votes, or that the sum of votes for all parties will be greater or less than 100%. Moreover, 
even when p oint predictions happen to fall within the constraints of the simplex, the full 
probabilistic implications of the model are virtually always logically impossible, as some 
of the predictive density always falls outside the simplex. Some of the few who recognize 
this problem transform Vii to an unbounded scale (separately for  each party j ) ,  such as 
with a logistic function, and then apply separate or seeming unrelated regressions, but 
this too is insufficient: the results will satisfy Equation 1 but not Equation 2 .  Similarly, 
running only J - 1 regressions and computing the predictions for ViJ from the others 
satisfies Equation 2 but not Equation 1 .  Various._other ad hoc approaches can be taken 
to· fix different ·parts of the problem but , especially because computing most quantities 
of interest require the full probabilistic model , we decided to pursue a more general 
approach. 
The model we develop can be considered a generalization of two independent lines of 
statistical research. The first line of research includes models for "compositional data" 
(Aitchison, 1986), a term that describes data sets with multiple outcome variables that 
sum to unity for each observation. A few of the many examples of compositional data from 
other fields inc lude soil samples in geology (with measurements of the fractions of sand, 
silt, and c lay) , rock samples in geochemistry (with fractions of alkali, Fe203 , and MgO) ,  
and blood measurements in biology (proportions of white blood cell types measured for 
each patient ) .  Compositional data are also common in political science and economics 
(as in multi party voting data, the allocation of ministerial p ortfolios among political 
parties, trade flows or international conflict directed from each nation to several others, 
or proportions of budget expenditures in each of several categories) , but researchers in 
these fields have not taken advantage of the connection to this more general statistical 
approach. This is unfortunate since compositional data would seem to be closely related 
to the raison d'etre of political science research: if politics  is the authoritative allocation 
of resources ,  then fractions of resources received by each group is exactly compositional 
data. 
The key contribution of this literature is statistical models that allow only possible 
outcomes to occur. That is, predictions or simulations from such a model satisfy Equa­
tions 1 and 2 or, in other words, have positive density only over the simplex. The most 
influential models of compositional data are due primarily to Aitchison ( 1986), who crit­
icized the earlier models based on Dirchlet distributions, since those models require the 
"compositions" (votes for each party in our application) to be independent. Aitchison 
avoided this unrealistic assumption by applying the normal distribution to the log-ratios 
of the individual components. This procedure starts with the multivariate normal fit to 
the unconstrained real plane and then maps it into the simplex via the multivariate lo­
gistic transformation. This works in the same way as, for example, the log-normal maps 
the real number line onto the positive real numbers . 
The second statistically similar, but independent, line of research that we generalize 
are models of votes and seats for two-party systems (King and Browning, 1987; King, 
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1989b; King and Gelman, 199 1 ;  and Gelman and King, 199 1 ) , and for multiparty systems 
(by King 1990) . Like compositional models, some of these votes and seats models also 
transform votes (in different ways) using logistic transformations and then stochastically 
model the transformed variables. The resulting statistical models differ in a variety of 
ways, but they also constrain the result to the proper sample space so that Equations 1 
and 2 are satisfied. 
Unfortunately, the models from neither line of research will work without modifica­
tion for multiparty voting data. For one, our extensive evaluations of the assumptions 
of normality underlying the models proposed for compositional data indicate that they 
do not fit real election data. For another, these models also do not capture a fundamen­
tal feature of voting data: the pattern of "missing data" that occurs when one or more 
parties receive zero votes in a district ,  as occurs when no candidate from a party stands 
for election in a district .  Zero vote totals in electoral data constitute politically crucial 
information and must therefore be treated very differently from examples where ·zeros are 
considered to be missing due to slight measurement error (as when instruments for mea­
suring the compositions of soil samples miss the always-present traces of some elements) . 
The models discussed above for analyses of seats and votes fit two-party systems well 
and (for King, 1990) they can fit multiparty data on seats given votes, and some of these 
include special features for uncontested districts, but they are not directly applicable to 
explaining or predicting multiparty electoral data. 
Thus, a proper model of multiparty voting data must have the following special 
features. It must have positive density only over the simplex and must use a distribution 
more flexible than the multivariate normal, which does not fit real voting qata. It must 
also allow covariates (explanatory variables) . Section 5 provides this baS_�� model for 
,.�, � 
fully contested district elections. The model must also provide special fe�tures to deal 
with uncontested and partially contested seats, which we do in Section 6 .  ·:J'he complete 
likelihood function is given in Section 7. -"' ,---; 
� 
Finally, a proper model must allow for estimates of precisely the quantj£ies of scholarly 
interest, and these may differ across applications. That is, we should not have to teach 
readers to interpret the arcane results of statistical models; rather, the models should be 
modified to produce results in the form of most natural interest to subs� tively-oriented 
political scientists. For example, the raw coefficients estimated by mqdels of composi­
tional data are not the quantities of interest for any political ,  or imi�ed for virtually 
any non-political , application. We use methods of simulation, described. in. Section 8 ,  to 
compute estimates of a wide range of theoretically interesting quantities� These methods 
of computing quantities of interest are critical to political science applications of this new 
model. We also believe the methods will enable those in other scholarly_disciplines, who 
use somewhat related models for very different purposes, to compute numerical quantities 
of more interest to their research than the usual results of comp osition9'1 data models. 
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·. 5 The Basic Model for Fully Contested Elections 
In  this section, we only consider district elections that all parties contest and in which 
every party gets at least one vote: '\lij E (0, 1) for all i and j. Since, in practice, no 
officially registered candidate that appears on the ballot ever gets fewer than 1 5-20% of 
the vote in our data, the only real assumption here is that all parties contest all district 
elections. We generalize this model to deal with partially contested elections in Section 
6 .  
Let Vi = (Vii , . . .  , Vi(J-l) )  be  a (J - 1 )  x.1 vector for each district i ( i  = 1 ,  .. . , n) . 
This vector contains all the information in the individual vote fractions since the votes 
for party J can be computed deterministically from the others: 
J-1 
ViJ = 1 - Z:Vij (3 ) 
j=l 
The model we are about to propose is "symmetric ," in the sense that changing the party 
labeled J does not affect anything of substantive importance. 
Aitchison ( 1986) proposes that compositional data like Vi be modeled with his additive 
logistic normal distribution. This distribution can be formed as follows. First let Yi be 
the vector of J - 1 log-ratios Yij = ln(Vij/ViJ ) ,  for  party j (j = 1 . . . , J - 1 )  relative to 
party J. Then assume that the (J - 1)  x 1 vector Yi= (Yi1 ,  . . .  , Yi(J-1) )  is multivariate 
normal with mean vector µ and variance matrix�.  To get to the observed V<?tes, use the 
multivariate logistic transformation: ; � 
V;. _ exp(Yij) 
tJ - J-1 1 + I:j=l exp(Yij) 
...  
(4) 
Although compositional data analysts have found this specification -to: be useful for 
their applications, we demonstrate below that it is inappropriate for rri�ltiparty voting 
data. In our data, a majority of districts tend to be more highly c lustered., and a minority 
are much more widely dispersed, than the multivariate normal implies . .. 
-::::� 
Political scientists modeling seats and votes have avoided this  disttj.qutional problem 
by a combination of mixtures of independent normals and appropriat�fr chosen covari­
ates, but these fixes are insufficient for a general approach to multipar_tY voting data. 
We now derive a new model that solves these problems. We lab�[t�e distribution 
the additive logistic Student t (LT) distribution, which we demonstratejs superior when 
used to fit political data than the additive logistic normal, which it inclµdes as a limiting 
special case. To derive the LT distribution, first let Yi be multivariate S�dent t (Johnson 
1 1  
and Kotz, 1972) and then apply the transformation in Equation 4: 
P (\!ij µ, L:, v) =LT(\!ij µ, I:, v) 
=T [ln(Vi/ViJ) l µi, I:) ;nf ::; \!ij 
r[(v + 1 - 1)/2JIL:l-112 
(5) 
where the extra factor in the denominator is the Jacobian of the transformation (required 
when creating a new distribution from an existing one through a deterministic transfor­
mation), the expected value and variance of }ii are µij and L:v / (v - 2), and v (v > 0) 
is the "degrees of freedom" parameter. The ( J - 1) x ( J - 1) parameter L: is known as 
the "scatter" matrix. This distribution happens to be equivalent to the predictive distri­
bution, under certain conditions, when using the additive logistic normal (see Aitchison, 
1986: 174). 
This model differs from the additive logistic normal when v < oo, and it differs more 
the smaller v is. We find in practice that our estimates of v are fairly small and thus 
the LT distribution differs significantly from the additive logistic normal.6 For example, 
Figure 3 gives two ternary diagrams with normal (for the left graph) and t (for the right 
graph) confidence regions fit to real electoral data (from 1970) . For both, the inner loop 
is the 50% confidence region, and, if the model is appropriate, 50% of the p oints should 
fall within it. In fact, 66 .7% fall within the normal-based region, whereas 48 .5% of the 
points fall within the t-based region. A similar situation, but slightly less extreme, holds 
for the 95% confidence region, which is the outer loop in both graphs. (Because of the 
large number of constituencies, the figure is more useful for understanding the differences 
in how the two models fit these data, and the nature of confidence regions on the simplex, . 
rather than making· it easy to count points within each region. )  This demonstrates clearly 
the advantage of the t distribution for British electoral data.7 
When v is sufficiently large, the normal and t distributions are identical . This means 
that our generalization has great potential benefits, because it fits a much wider range 
of data more common in multiparty democracies, and it is also essentially costless (i .e., 
except for the trivial efficiency loss caused by estimating the extra degrees of freedom 
parameter) . Given this risk profile, there seems little reason to not use this more general 
model . 
6So that we consider only cases where the moments exist on the logistic scale, we impose the technical 
restriction that v > 2. This assumption, while not necessary for our model or estimator (since the 
moments of the additive logistic t are always finite) , does make estimation and simulation simpler. 
Given that our estimates of v stay far from the boundary (even when permitted to do otherwise) this 
technical assumption is unambiguously supported by our data. 
7The fit of the model could be closer to a normal after conditioning on explanatory variables, but our 
studies indicate that this is not usually the case with our multiparty data. We present the simple case 
in Figure 3 without covariates for ease of presentation. 
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Figure 3: The Fit of the Logistic Normal and Logistic t distributions: Both graphs give 
a ternary diagram for 1 970 British House of Commons electoral data, with uncontested 
districts deleted, and 50% and 95% confidence regions based on the additive logistic nor­
mal in (A) and additive logistic t in (B). The better fit to the t distribution is indicated 
by the approximately 50% and 95% of the constituencies that fall within the 50% and 
95% confidence region, respectively, for the t distribution, but only 64% and 91% for the 
normal. Note also how the inner region is much narrower, and the outer region-is wider, 
for the t than the normal. 
The generalization that the additive logistic t provides would be traditionally de­
scribed (by using the general textbook description for t-based distributions) as allowing 
for "fatter tails" - a small number of constituencies surprisingly (according to the nor­
mal) far from the center of the distribution. This description is accurate, but a perhaps 
more informative characterization is the other half of the story: when v is small, most of 
the constituencies are surprisingly (according to the normal) heavily clustered together 
(compare the inner confidence region in the two graphs in Figure 3). That is, what the_ 
traditional  description of t-based distributions miss is that when v is small, a t  distribu- -
tion with the same variance as a normal has both fat tails and heavier cluster around 
the mode. The two features must exist simultaneously to counterbalance each other, in 
order that the result is a proper distribution. O ur reason for also emphasizing the heavy 
cluster is that this describes more of the points than focusing on the relatively small 
number of "outliers" in the tails. 
As can be seen by the counts of districts within the confidence regions in Figure 3, 
the additive logistic t model fits the data better than the additive logistic normal. The 
substantive reason is that most constituencies in England have vote fractions that are 
very similar to one another, but a smaller set of constituencies are quite far from this 
main cluster. 
We also present, in Figure 4, summaries of the fit of the two distributions for all the 
elections in our data. For each election year, the figure gives the percentage of districts 
that fall within the 50%,  80%, and 95% confidence regions. Graph (A) shows that for the 
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Figure 4: Confidence Region Coverage: These graphs summarize the fit of the additive 
logistic normal (A) and additive logistic t (BJ distributions for all U.K. elections in our 
data set. For each election, the solid lines mark the percent coverage for the 50%, 80%, 
and 95% confidence regions (where dotted lines are drawn) . The better fit of the t distri­
bution is indicated by the actual number of constituencies within each region (indicated 
by the solid line} staying much closer to the dotted line for the t than for the normal. 
additive logistic normal model , the actual fraction of points within each of these regions 
(indicated by solid lines) vary quite a distance from the theoretically correct (straight 
dotted) lines. (For visual clarity, the solid lines connect the points at the elections, where 
the estimation was actually conducted.) In contrast, the actual and theoretical values 
are very close for the additive logistic t, portrayed in graph (B) . The normal seems to 
fit better for more recent elections than it once did, but there is no reason to think that 
this trend will continue. 
For applications , we let the means of the log-ratios be linear functions of vectors of 
explanatory variables: 
(6) 
where Xij is a Pi x 1 vector of explanatory variables, and /3j are parameters to be 
estimated. For most applications the explantory variables will be the same for all j, 
but this is not required. The parameters /3j , :E, and v are of little direct interest , but we 
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show in Section 8 how to compute quantities of interest from them. 
6 Assumptions for Partly Contested Districts 
We now introduce methods of generalizing the basic model in Section 5 to allow for 
districts where some parties do not contest the outcome. 
We follow King a�d Gelman (1991) by setting as the goal of estimation the effective 
vote - values of 1/ij that we would observe if all J parties contested the election in district 
i'. fo districts with all parties contesting, the effective vote is the observed vote. In partly 
contested districts , the effective vote for all parties is unobserved but can be estimated. 
(That is , in districts where any party chooses not to contest, we lose information about 
the effective vote proportion for all parties since those which contest might get different 
vote fractions if they faced more competition. ) 
The effective vote concept covers all "national" political parties , even if they do not 
contest all elections. We distinguish regional parties , and do not try to estimate strained 
counterfactuals such as what would happen if, for example, the Scottish nationalists ran 
in English constituencies. Regional parties are easy to include in our model, although 
for expository purposes we skip this issue here. 
In order to analyze the effective vote in not-fully-contested districts, some assumptions 
must be made. We introduce here several assumptions designed for electoral systems 
where the candidates and parties decide for themselves whether to contest a district 
election. 8 A reasonable assumption under these circumstances is that a party which 
chooses not to contest would not have won if it had nominated a candidate. After all, if 
they would have won, they probably would have nominated someone in the first place. 
Even if this assumption were false, it is unlikely that any statistical analyst could come 
up with a more realistic assumption than the non-contesting party is effectively able to 
do for us . 
It also seems highly likely that the party not contesting the election would have 
received fewer votes , if it had contested, than the parties that did nominate candidates , 
and so we expand the assumption to this this more encompassing version. We recognize 
that this more encompassing assumption may occasionally be wrong. In other words, it 
is conceivable that the non-contesting party, if it ran, might get more votes (and yet still 
lose) than one of the parties that chose to run. However, even if this assumption were 
violated, the degree of violation would very rarely be large enough to make a noticeable 
80ther assumptions would be necessary when, for example, a pro-government election commission 
prevents opposition parties from entering a race because they might win, as occurs in some of the new 
Eastern European "democracies". Similarly, when a small party, in a deal with a larger party, agrees to 
not contest in certain areas (as in the recent New Zealand elections) , these assumptions would not hold. 
In these cases, our model could be modified accordingly. In all cases, scholars should tune the model 
assumptions to what we know about the details of party politics. 
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substantive difference. Moreover, the alternative possible assumptions are more arb'itrary 
and would be difficult to justify. 
Other assumptions could be chosen based on models of candidate entry and exit for 
different electoral systems, or by focusing on different features of the British electoral 
system (such as the requirement that candidates lose a monetary deposit if they do not 
receive a certain fraction of the vote) . Our methods for deriving the model below under 
our chosen assumptions can be easily modified to handle these alternatives. 
If covariates that predict which parties contest in each constituency are available, 
they can be used in interactions with indicator variables that code for the patterns 
of uncontestedness to avoid assumptions about parameter equivalence between district 
elections that are fully and partly contested. In most cases, these variables will be useful 
but not necessary. An alternative approach would be to develop full-blown models that 
predict which parties contest in each district as separate equations. Although future 
researchers may wish to consider this alternative approach, we do not pursue it because 
it is unnecessary, would make the model less robust, and, would require data that are 
very hard to come by in most applications. 
We make no assumption analogous to "independence of irrelevant alternatives ," as 
is sometimes necessary for individual-level, survey-based statistical models of multiparty 
voter choice (see Alvarez and Nagler, forthcoming). That is, our assumptions , and the 
model built from them, allow the entry or exit of a party into a district election contest 
to affect the relative vote totals of the parties already in the race. 
. . 
7 Estimation 
·, 
�-"'-
In this section, we propose methods of estimating the parameters of the mod�l ,  (3 = {{Ji}, 
I:, and v. Section 8 explains how to compute quantities of interest give:rfthese results. 
If all districts were contested by all parties, we could estimate the::parameters by 
maximum likelihood. That is , we would maximize the log of the additive logistic t 
distribution in Equation 5, summed over all observations, with respect t<A"the parameters. 
However, complications arise in partly contested districts . One attractive approach for 
"missing data" problems such as this is to use "Markov Chain Monte= Carlo" (MCMC) 
methods (see Tanner, 1997). For example, we could impute the misslng· data given a 
guess for the parameters; then estimate the parameters given these "completed" data via 
maximum likelihood; then use these better parameter estimates to imp_�te more realistic 
values for the missing data; and so on until (stochastic) convergence. �.:::. 
-
We have implemented a version of this MCMC approach, but in otir experience and 
with our three-party data, this procedure is relatively slow, primarily because each of 
the two steps in every iteration is itself iterative. We therefore offer an alternative direct 
likelihood approach that is approximately twenty times faster. Our studies indicate that 
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the direct likelihood approach is faster for smaller numbers of parties, but the MCMC 
approach will be more computationally efficient for larger numbers of parties. 
In the remainder of this section , we describe our direct likelihood approach. We begin 
by denoting the set of parties contesting the election in district i as Pi, a set that can 
take on seven patterns: {1 ,  2 ,  3}, {2 ,  3}, {1, 3} ,  {1, 2}, {1 }, {2}, and {3}.9 
When the effective vote is observed for all parties , the likelihood is the probability 
density of the observed variables. For simplicity , we write the likelihood ·as a function of Yi 
rather than Vi , although the two give equivalent results . For districts w ith fully contested 
elections, the observed vote (Vii, V'i2, Vi;) equals the effective vote (Vi1 , Vi2 , '\ti3 ) .  Thus, 
li1 = ln (Vii/Vi3) and li2 = ln (Vi2/Vi3) are both observed and the likelihood function is 
the bivariate t probability density: 
L{123} = II T(lii , Yi2l7/i) (7) 
P;={l,2,3} 
with parameters 
(8) 
(and where ai , a2 , and p make up the scatter matrix) . This density differs from the 
additive logistic t for Vi in Equation 5 by a constant factor (the Jacobian of the trans­
formation), which thus establishes the equivalence of writing the likelihood as a function 
of either Vi or }i .  
When some of the effective votes are not observed (due to political pax�ies not con-
"· testing an election ) ,  our assumptions designate a region in which the vote;variable falls, 
in which case the likelihood is the area (or volume) under the probability density cor­
responding to this known region . Appendix A derives the likelihood fuit�tfon for these 
cases. 
The complete likelihood function is the product of the likelihood fort-he fully contested 
case in Equation 7, and the partially contested cases derived in Appendix A and given 
in Equations 12, 15 , 16, 17, 18 , and 19: 
(9 ) 
where we define the product over a null set (when no district elections offhe ty pe exists) as 
equaling unity . We also substitute µi1 = Xi1/31 and µi2 = Xi2/32 to introduce (overlapping, 
identical, or different sets of) covariates Xii and Xi2 . For our present- application , we 
define Xii and Xi2 to include a lag of }ii , a lag of li2 , and three indl�ator variables to 
represent incumbency status for each party . We have conducted many other runs with 
demographics and other variables included, but, as is consistent with.- the results from 
9Suppose they held an election and nobody ran? We ignore this amusing eighth possible pattern, 
despite its occasional appearance in some very low visibility local U.S. elections. In general, the number 
of patterns of missing data is 2J. 
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analy ses in the U .S. and other democracies, these tend to have only minor effects on our 
estimates of incumbency advantage. 
To facilitate maximization , and to make the asymptotic normal approximations we 
use below feasible with fewer observations, it is helpful to reparameterize so that all 
parameters are unbounded (ranging between -oo and oo) , as /31 and f32 already are. 
Thus, our full set of transformations are as follows: 
e2c/>s - 1 
p = e�c/>3 + 1 
v = 2 + eq,4 (10) 
where the form of the equation for ¢3 is the inverse of Fisher's (1915) " Z  transformation'' 
(keeping p between -1 and 1 no matter what value ¢3 takes) and c/J4 constrains v to 
be greater than two in order to guarantee that the moments of the distribution on the 
logistic scale exist. 
To summarize all our knowledge about and uncertainty in the parameter vector 
(11) 
we maximize the likelihood function . This gives us an asy mptotic normal posterior 
distribution with the maximum likelihood point estimates as a mean vector and, as 
usual , the inverse of the negative of the hessian as the variance matrix.10 
Because maximum likelihood is invariant to reparameterization (see King, 1989), es­
timating ¢ and transforming to get 'ljJ, or estimating 'ljJ directly ,  give the same point 
estimates. We also use the standard "empirical Bayes" approach to specify normal priors 
(i .e . ,  the hyperparameters are "estimated" from the means and variances of the max­
imum likelihood estimates across our ten election years) . Our empirical results below 
are qualitatively the same as with straightforward maximum likelihood, but, as usual, 
empirical Bayes helps to reduce the across and within year random variability . 
8 Computing Quantities of Interest 
Since the point of developing a model of voting in a multi party democracy is to explain 
and predict election results, our model ought to be capable of computing  quantities on the 
10We verified this asymptotic normal approximation by comparisons with the exact (i.e. , finite sample) 
posterior distribution, thus avoiding the large-n assumption altogether. We did this with the technique of 
"importance sampling," an iterative simulation method based on a probabilistic rejection algorithm (see 
Tanner, 1997). Our experiments with this procedure indicate that the point estimates we report below 
are correct, and the standard errors are if anything conservative (i.e. , somewhat larger than they should 
be). Because importance sampling is very computationally intensive and hence would be more difficult 
for others to apply, and since we found that the two approaches did not suggest any real substantive 
differences in our data, the analyses below are based on the asymptotic normal approximation. 
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scale of reported votes. That is, the estimated </> parameters that result from maximizing 
the likelihood are important, but they are of little direct interest .  For starters , they are 
reparameterized for estimation via Equations 10. But even transforming back to the 
original 'ljJ scale, by inverting these equations, is not that helpful since the estimation was 
done on the additive logistic scale rather than on the scale of substantive interest - the 
votes . The quantities of direct substantive interest are complicated functions of these 
parameters . 
Computing some of these quantities of interest is possible analy tically (through Tay lor 
series approximations and the like) , but it would be difficult. Computing many others is 
impossible. We simplify these problems by substituting cqmputer time for human effort 
via a technique called random simulation (also called stochastic simulation, or Monte 
Carlo simulation, etc. ) .  This is an increasingly popular technique in statistical analy sis 
(see Jackman, 1996; Tanner, 1997; Gelman et al . ,  1995). Because simulation can generate 
results w ith any desired degree of precision, the technique entails no compromises (given 
a sufficiently powerful computer) . 
We describe the calculation of three quantities of interest in this section, a predicted 
vote, an expected vote, and a causal effect . With each, we use a combination of classical 
and Bayesian techniques. We save the calculation of other quantities, such as bias and 
responsiveness, for a future paper. 
8 . 1  Predicted Vote 
Our quantity of interest in this section is the probability distribution describing the 
predicted allocation of votes in a district conditional on a fixed value for each of the 
explanatory variables . The prediction is therefore a probability distribution over the 
simplex. 
Our first requirement is a method of drawing one random election result from the ap­
proximate posterior distribution given the estimated model , which we label (Vpi, Vp2, �3), 
where the p subscript is mnemonic for prediction and the tilde indicates that the values 
have been simulated. We draw this simulated district election result given a set of values 
for the explanatory variables Xp1 and Xp2 (each being row vectors) . To accomplish this 
we follow this algorithm: 
1. Maximize the likelihood function in Section 7 (with the empirical Bay es priors) , 
and record the vector of maximum likelihood estimates, ¢, and the variance matrix, 
v(¢) . 
2. Take one random draw of </>, which we designate as ¢, from a multivariate normal 
distribution with mean J and variance V(¢) . 
3 .  Reparameterize from ;/> to -J; by using Equations 10, where we use Xp1 and Xp2 in 
computing µp1 and µp2· 
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4. Draw "f;i1 and Yp2 randomly from a bivariate t distribution with parameters ;/J. 
5. Compute �1, �2, and VP3 deterministically from Yp1 and Yp2 by the multivariate 
logistic transformation in Equation 4. 
To compute the distribution of election results given Xp, we repeat Steps 2-5 of this 
algorithm M times (we find that M = 1000 is sufficient for most purposes) . Then our 
approximate posterior distribution of Vp1 is merely a histogram of the simulated values. 
A point estimate of th� three party vote results can be computed by taking the numerical . 
average of the simulations for each party . A standard error can be computed by taking 
the standard �eviation of the simulations for each party . Similarly a (say ) 80% confidence 
interval can be computed by sorting the values in numerical order and taking the values 
at the 10th and goth percentiles. The full approximate posterior distribution may be 
calculated by a two-dimensional histogram over the simplex. 
For an example of simulating predictive quantities of interest, we give an inference 
about a predicted value from a ty pical open seat . To be specific, we first estimated the 
model for 1987 with lags of }i1 and }i2 and two in dicators for incumbency status. We 
included all variables in both equations .  We then set the explanatory variables (Xp1 amd 
Xp2) such that none of the candidates are presently members of the House of Commons, 
and the previous vote (i.e . ,  in 1983) is equal to the average vote across constituencies 
(Vpc = 0.46 , VpL = 0. 28, and VpA = . 26). We then applied the algorithm above to y ield 
500 simulations of the three vote vectors. 
We use two graphical methods for portray ing the results from this prediction , both 
appearing in Figure 5. Graph (A) in this figure plots the 500 simulations in one ternary 
diagram. The simulations are all predictions for a single district and thus vary only 
due to uncertainty in the prediction ; the collection of dots in this figure then portray s  
the full nature of the probabilistic prediction about where the point (given the values of 
the explanatory variables) is likely to be. That is, we have higher confidence that the 
actual district vote in the average open seat district will be where the heavy cluster of 
the dots fall, and the result will fall with smaller probability where there are fewer dots. 
Substantively , the result shows that this typical district is very likely to be won by the 
Conservatives, since most of the mass of points fall into the upper third of the triangle. 
(The actual probability that this district will be won by the Conservatives equals the 
fraction of simulated dots that fall in . this top region defined by the win lines. ) 
Graph (B) in Figure 5 gives density estimates (smooth versions of histograms) for each 
of the three vote variables. This graph helps emphasize the separate, but still obviously 
related, nature of the three variables. Each density estimate portrayed in the graph is an 
approximate posterior distribution of that quantity (i.e . ,  it can be thought of as a pile 
of predictions or simulations) , indicating where the future value of that vote is likely to 
be. Judging from the very little overlap in the distributions ,  it is highly likely that the 
Conservatives will out poll the Labour and Alliance parties . The Labour party will likely 
do better than the Alliance in this constituency ,  but because of the heavy overlap in 
these two distributions, this inference is less certain . Note that all information in Graph 
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(A) Ternary Plot of Predicted Votes (B) Density Plot of Predicted Votes 
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Figure 5 :  Simulations of a Predicted Value: This figure interprets the results of a model 
by computing the distributional implications of a single prediction (for an open seat in the 
constituency with the average vote). Graph (A) plots 500 simulations from this prediction 
on a ternary diagram; Graph (B) gives density estimates of the simulations from the 
same three vote variables. According to the prediction, the district 's vote heavily favors 
the Conservatives. 
(B) can also be found in Graph (A) , although the images emphasize different aspects of 
the data. 
In an application with a variety of explanatory variables, we would normally do many 
different computations like this. This would enable the researcher to understand the many 
substantive implications of models like this . To do this, we would set the explanatory 
variables at many different sets of values (low income and heavily minority ; high income 
and rural, etc . ) . In this situation, we may wish more parsimonious summaries of the 
simulations such as point estimates and standard errors, or confidence intervals. 
8 . 2  Expected Vote 
Our knowledge of all real world random processes is affected by both fundamental vari­
ability and estimation variability. Estimation variability results from the limited number 
of observations we were able to collect  (or the limited number of districts we are · ana­
ly zing) . If n were very large, estimation variability would vanish. In contrast, even if 
we had an infinite number of observations, the fundamental variability in the real world 
would still prevent our vote predictions from being perfect .  Estimation variability is in­
troduced because of the investigators' "failings," whereas fundamental variability affects 
our results because the world we are study ing is intrinsically variable. 
Our procedure for computing the predicted vote in Section 8. 1 reflects both sources of 
variability . In the algorithm of that section, Step 2 simulates estimation variability (by 
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drawing ¢> from its distribution) and Step 4 simulates fundamental variability (by drawing 
the logit of the vote variables from a t distribution) .  Since we wished the simulations 
to reflect our knowledge of the distribution of votes, both sources of variability were 
essential. 
Closely related to computing the predicted vote is estimating the expected vote in a 
district : [E(Yp1) ,  E(Yp2 ) ,  E(Yp3)) .  Like the predicted vote, these expected votes are also 
conditional on chosen values of the explanatory variables, XP ' Although fundamental 
variability affects our estimate of the expected value, we need to average over it to produce 
the expectation. In other words, the expected vote is fixed; and only our estimation of it 
is imperfect: if n were sufficiently large, the expected vote simulations would be constant . 
In practice, of course, our estimation procedure will produce uncertain estimates of the 
(fixed) expected vote.1 1  
To compute one simulation of  the expected vote, which we denote [E(Vp1 ) ,  E(Yp2) ,  E(Yp3)] , 
we follow this algorithm. 
1. Maximize the likelihood function in Section 7 (with the empirical Bayes priors) , 
and keep the vector of maximum likelihood estimates ,  J> and the variance matrix, 
v(¢) . 
2 .  Take one random draw of ¢>, which we designate as ¢, from a multivariate normal 
distribution with mean J> and variance V(¢) . 
3. Reparameterize from ¢> to 1/; by using Equations 10, where we use Xp1 and Xp2 in 
computing µp1 and µp2 , respectively. " · 
... -
- - � - :  
4. Draw m v�lues of  Yp1 and Yp2 randomly from a bivariate t distrib�tion with pa-
rameters 1/;.  (m = 100 is usually sufficient. )  -,.:,.-
5 .  Compute m simulations of Vp1 and Vp2 deterministically from each of the m simu­
lations of Yp1 and Yp2 by using the multivariate logistic transformation in Equation 
4. 
- :E " 
6 .  Calculate the numerical average of the m simulations of �1 and Vp2 to yield one 
simulation of the expected votes, E(Vp1) and E(Vp2) ,  respectivelY, Compute the 
�imulatior_: of the expected vote for party J = 3 by subtractiq_p._: E(Vp3) = 1 -
E(Vp1) - E(Vp2) 
We repeat steps 2-6 of this algorithm M times to produce M simulations of the 
expected vote, the mean of which is our point estimate, the standard''d�viation is the 
standard error, and a histogram of each component is the full probability density (M = 
1000 is usually sufficient) . 
1 1The difference between the expected vote, and the predicted vote in Section 8.1 , is primarily in the 
variability around the mean. If the model were linear, the average of the simulations of predicted votes 
and expected votes would be identical; in our case, the two are close. 
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8 . 3  Causal Effects, Including Incumbency Advantage 
A causal effect is the difference between two expected votes given a change in the value of 
only one explanatory variable. For example, the incumbency advantage is the difference 
in the expected vote in a district with an incumbent running and the expected vote in the 
same district at the same time when the incumbent's party decides to nominate the best 
available non-incumbent willing to run (Gelman and King, 1990). That is, under this 
thought experiment, everything is held constant up to the start of the general election 
campaign, at _which point either the incumbent runs · for reelection or does not . 
The causal effect of incumbency status in· multiparty democracies is of course some­
what more complicated than two-party systems, since the effect on the expected vote of, 
for example, a Conservative incumbent seeking reelection may be of a different magni­
tude than for an Alliance or Labour incumbent. Such a partisan differential would also 
seem more likely in legislatures with more parties. In multi party democracies·, · we could 
estimate the incumbency advantage averaged over the parties, but we prefer to estimate 
them separately in order to highlight several interesting substantive differences in our 
data. 
Computing a causal effect thus requires two sets of expected votes, one with an 
incumbent and the other with no incumbent. To draw simulations of the causal effect of 
incumbency, we take the difference between a simulation of the expected vote when the 
incumbency status variable in Xp indicates a particular party's incumbent is running for 
reelection, and when Xp indicates an open seat, with all other variables held constant at 
(say) their means. That is, we maximize the likelihood and then run the- algorithm in 
Section 8.2 twice, with a change only in the incumbency status variable. � � 
�: -
We estimated the advantage due to three types of changes in incumbency status -
open seat to a Conservative incumbent , an open seat to a Labour incmi}bent, and an 
open seat to an Alliance incumbent - in each of the 10 election years from' 1959 to 1992. 
The additional complication is that for one year, and for one type of incumbency effect , 
we need to record changes to all three vote variables . To display an�:tliis information 
succinctly, we have devised a new graphical display. For example, F1gure 6 presents 
the raw results for each year and type of effect. The top panel show� the effect of a 
Conservative incumbent, and each arrow in the large left portion of tiiis graphic is the 
change from an open seat - which we construct so that it begins at the point on the 
line at the year indicated - to where the expected vote would be wiJJi a Conservative 
incumbent , as if each were part of a ternary diagram. Hence, the high�r each arrow 
extends vertically (i.e . ,  not the length of the arrow, although the two . are obviously 
related) , the larger is the incumbency advantage to the Conservative pa�ty. The scale on 
the left of the graph is in percentage points of incumbency advantage.--_--:. 
' 
The direction each arrow leans indicates from which party the ccmservatives draw 
votes when they run an incumbent versus running another candidate in. an open contest, 
with the vertices of the implicit ternary diagram indicated around the standard errors 
at the right. (Note also that there is a standard error in each direction, indicated by the 
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Figure 6: Incumbency Advantage: The vertical distance each arrow is above the line 
indicates the advantage of running an incumbent, as compared to a nonincumbent, to the 
party indicated. The direction the arrow comes from indicates from which of the other 
parties support is being drawn (as indicated by the ends of the standard error bars, at 
the right) . Note that the scale, in percentage points for all three parties, is larger for the 
Alliance graph than for the other two. 
length of each of the standard error arrows at the right. 12 ) Thus, since all the arrows lean 
at least somewhat to the right in the top panel, Conservative incumbents draw more from 
the Alliance than from the Labor party to form their personal vote. To our knowledge, 
this type of effect has not been in the estimated elections literature of any country. 
The most striking effect in Figure 6 is the unambiguous positive effect of incumbency, 
for all ten elections and incumbents of all three parties over half a century of British 
politics. This is indicated by every one of the 30 arrows in the figure pointing above the 
zero line. Most of the individual effects in Figure 6 are larger than their standard errors. 
When pooled, the average effects for each party's incumbent are 2-5 times their standard 
errors, and hence by any relevant statistical standard clearly greater than zero. Figure 
12Because the Alliance receives many fewer votes on average than the other parties, the maximum 
range of votes that could be drawn from the Alliance to form a personal vote for any party's incumbents 
is quite small. As a result, the Alliance standard errors in Figures 6 and 7 are smaller than for the 
Conservatives or Labour. 
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Figure 7 :  Average Incumbency Advantage: This figure gives the incumbency advantage 
averaged over all the years portrayed in Figure 6, for which the intepretation is analogous. 
Note the scale for the Alliance graph, which is larger than _the others. 
7 gives these average effects for each party. (As always, the standard error of an average 
is smaller than the standard error of its component parts . )  
The summary in Figure 7 indicates that the average incumbency effect for the Con­
servatives is about half a percentage point, and for the Labour party it is twice as large, 
a full percentage point. In fact, in every one of the ten elections in Figure 6 ,  the Labour 
incumbency effect is larger than the Conservative effect. Our interpretation of this dis­
parity (which is necessarily more speculative than our results) is that Labour incumbents 
serve working class constituents and so have more constituency service to dole out. They 
have the discression to influence the position of people on various types of lists for social 
services, such as to get into, or to rennovate, council housing. Conservative members 
have few of these opportunities when serving their relatively more wealthy constituents 
with government services, and so their personal vote should not be as large. 
Alliance incumbents receive an advantage of three percentage points (thrice the 
Labour advantage) .  This is not quite the size of the 8-9 percentage point incumbency 
advantage.- in the U.S .  House of Representatives, but it is only slightly smaller than the - ­
size of the average advantage due to incumbency in the House in the mid-1960s or  in 
most American state legislatures today. This effect is in part because the counterfactual 
involved in an open seat vs. an Alliance incumbent is more of a stretch in parts of the 
country than the analogous counterfactual involved for estimating major party incum­
bency effects . Having an Alliance incumbent in office implies that the major party hold 
on the political system has been broken, and voters take this cue to reevaluate their 
votes . Another way to look at it is that the collective action problem of moderate voters 
preferring the Alliance but wanting to avoid wasting their vote has been solved with an 
Alliance incumbent in office. Voters who prefer the Alliance Party when an Alliance 
incumbent is in office have less reason to vote strategically ( "tactically" as it is called in 
Britain) and instead cast their vote for their sincere preference. Presumably in response 
to this idea, the Alliance, much more than the major parties, run local , almost U.S .-style, 
candidate-centered campaigns (often nominating well-known nonpolitical personalities) , 
rather than national, party-oriented campaigns. The response to this , we believe, is the 
much larger Alliance incumbency advantage. 
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Taken together, these results support the claims of the new quantitative literature on 
the existence of the incumbency effect in Britain, but the size of the effect for all three 
parties is substantially smaller than previous biased methods had indicated. That is , our 
method is not biased and is also sufficiently powerful to be able to distinguish a small 
(but politically meaningful) effect from none at all. Our method is also able to discern 
distinctly different incumbency effects across the three parties. 
There appears to be a hint in the top panel of Figure 6 that the Conservative in­
cumbency advantage may be. growing slightly, but formal statistical tests clearly reject 
this possible trend. Moreover, Labour or Alliance incumbency effects display no such 
apparent pattern. Thus, we find no support for the other claim of the new quantitative 
literature that argues, against the conventional wisdom, that the personal vote has been 
dramatically increasing in recent years. 
When the Conservatives run an incumbent (as compared to no incumbent running) , 
they pull most of their extra personal vote from the Alliance. As explained, this can 
be seen because the arrow in the first panel of Figure 7, and all 10  arrows in the first 
panel of Figure 6, leans to the right - away from the "A" in the standard error diagram. 
Our interpretation of this clear result is due to the Alliance being a transitional party 
for voters on the way to supporting one of the major parties; only 20% of voters stick 
with the Alliance for more than one election (Butler and Stokes, 1969: 315-338) . Pre­
sumably because the Labour personal vote stems more from constituency service than 
the Conservatives (and because there are usually as many Conservative voters who could 
benefit from a Labour party member's constituency service as voters for the much smaller 
Alliance party who could benefit) , Labour Party incumbents pull approximately equally 
from the Conservatives and Alliance parties (see Cain et al. ,  1987) .13 
9 Concluding Remarks 
Our paper may help resolve an ongoing debate in the British elections literature. The 
conventional position is that incumbency advantage is nonexistent and has not changed. 
In contrast , a newer literature holds that incumbency advantage is moderate to large, 
and it is growing. With our approach, we find that both sides are right to an extent. 
That is , the incumbency advantage in England is small but meaningfully above zero. 
However, there is no evidence that these advantages are trending in any direction. In 
addition, our model is able to detect important differences among the parties, with the 
incumbency advantage for Labour being about twice that for the Conservatives, and the 
advantage for the Alliance triple that of Labour. 
13The Alliance party does not predictably draw more from either major party. However, there is one 
other feature of the last panel of Figure 6 that may reflect a systematic pattern: The Alliance incumbents 
drew their personal vote almost exclusively from the Labour party between 1959 and 1970, but then 
abruptly changed and started to draw votes in different ways from Labour and the Conservatives over 
the subsequent six elections. Since this "pattern" is based on only four elections, further research will 
be required before drawing firm substantive conclusions as to its cause. 
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We have developed and presented our statistical model for three parties and applied 
it to the British electoral system. The model and estimation procedures are all directly 
applicable to electoral systems with any number of parties. (And we plan to turn our 
computer code into an easy-to-use software program and to distribute it freely. ) Further 
research will be necessary to implement the more general version of our model. For 
one, our analytical approach, while much faster for three parties, does not scale up as 
well as a more general MCMC approach. Our experiments with MCMC applied to this 
problem convince us that it will scale fairly well. Priors may be needed given the large 
number of parameters· .relative to a. smaller number of districts, but there is substantial 
information in multiparty electoral systems tha_t would be extraordinarly valuable to 
r�earchers in·.comparative politics and so this extension seems well worth the effort . 
Our graphical displays obviously do not generalize directly to more than four parties, 
but with judicious use of color, shading, and perspective, we have found it possible to 
display the results from between five and eight parties, depending on how complicated 
and empirically clear the relationships are in the data. 
Many opportunities for future research remain in this area, three others of which we 
now describe. First, we can easily extend the interpretation of the model to include other 
quantities of interest, such as bias and responsiveness of the electoral system, important 
and controversial issues in the U .K.  and elsewhere. This can be done by clearly defining 
the quantity to be computed and then making slight modifications of the algorithms 
described in Section 8. 
Second , some two-party models of seats and votes have in recent incarnations included 
random effects terms, more highly modeled versions of what our empirical Bayes approach 
accomplishes for the multiparty case. These terms help keep the estimates reasonable 
even if certain types of explanatory variables are not observed and included in the model . 
They are especially well-suited to models of legislatures, since the structure of the random 
effects model can reflect the panel structure of the data. 
Finally, electoral systems vary considerably across countries . All but two countries 
have districts of some kind, and most elect legislators to more than one seat in a district. 
Modifications to fit all the different types of electoral systems will require some detailed 
work, but should be achievable by straightforward extensions of the model we present 
here. 
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Appendix A: The Likelihood Function for Partially 
Contested Districts 
A . 1  Districts with Two of Three Parties Contesting 
First consider elections where the parties contesting in district i include Pi = {2,  3} .  For 
these elections, the effective vote for all three parties, "\Iii , Vi2 and Vj3 , are unobserved. 
Nevertheless, our assumptions for less-than-fully contested elections introduced in Section 
6 imply that 'we have some information about these quantities. In particular, we know 
that Vj1 < min(Vi2 , Vi3) and therefore Y1i < min(O, Yi2) or, equivalently, Y1 < 0 and 
Y1 < Y2 . Thus, the likelihood function for this case is as follows: 
L23 = Pr(Yi1 < 0, Yi2 > Yi1 l'l/J) 
II 1° 100 T(Yii , Yi2 l'l/J)dYi2dYi1 
P;={2,3} -oo yil 
II [� T(Yi1 lµii , a1 , v) [l - FT(Yi1 lµ2Ji i  a211 , v + l) )dYi1 ( 12) 
P;={2,3} 
where FT is the cumulative distribution function of the (univariate) t ,  
µ211 = µi2 + (pa2/a1 ) (Yi1 - µil ) 
is the conditional mean of Yi2 given Yi1 and 
2 _ 2 (1  _ 2 ) ( v + (Yi1 - µi1 )2 /ar ) 0'211 - 0'2 p 1 v + 
(13) 
(14) 
� � 
is the conditional variance. These conditional t distributions are analogo� · �nd mathe­
matically similar to the more commonly known conditional normals (see Lili; 1994) .  The 
function in Equation 12 is easily calculated by one-dimensional numerical.��tegration. 
By a parallel logic, the likelihood function for district elections where -p�rties 1 and 3 
contest is : .. .' 
0 -.,, 
L13 = II [
00 
T(Yi2 lµi2 , a2 , v) [l - FT(Yi2 lµ112 , a112 , v + l ))tlYi2 (15) 
P;={l,3} ·"' �"\: 
· -
When parties 1 and 2 contest, but party 3 is missing, a slight computational difference 
occurs because Vi3 appears in the denominator of both Yi1 and }i2 . As a"!'esult, we know, 
by our assumption, that Vi3 < min(Vii , Vi2) ,  which translates into Yi1 > 0 and Yi2 > 0 .  
Hence: 
L12 = II [1 - FT(O, O l'l/J)] (16) 
P;={l,2} 
where FT is the cumulative distribution function of (in this context) t}fe bivariate t. To 
compute this function, we follow the standard procedure of applying one-:dimensional nu­
merical integration after factoring the joint t distribution into a marginal and conditional 
- directly analogous to Equation 12 .  
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� · A.2 Districts with One of Three Parties Contesting 
For example, when only party 1 contests (and hence automatically wins) , we have no 
information about }'i2 , but we know that }'i1 > 0. We use this information to form the 
likelihood function: 
L1 = II f00 f00 T(}'ii , Yi2 l1fl)dYi1dYi2 
P;={l} lo -oo 
= II (1 - FT(Olµil , ai , v)j 
P;={l} 
Similarly, the likelihood function for the remaining two cases is 
and 
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